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Abstract 
Purpose – Batteries installed on electric vehicles (EVs) should normally be removed 
when their capacity falls to 70-80%, but they are still usable for other purposes, such as 
energy storage. This paper studies an EV battery closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) con-
sisting of a battery manufacturer and a remanufacturer. The manufacturer produces new 
batteries by using natural resources, while the remanufacturer collects returned batteries 
and makes decisions based on the return quality, that is, to reuse or recycle. The purpose 
of this research is to maximise the individual profits through optimising the amount of 
manufacturing and remanufacturing respectively, and optimising the purchase price of 
returned batteries. 
Design/methodology/approach – Based on the Nash equilibrium, this paper develops 
a three-period model in the CLSC. In period 1, batteries are made from raw materials; 
in period 2, returned batteries from period 1 are sorted into low quality and high quality. 
Some high-quality returns can be reused for other purposes while those non-reusable 
returns are recycled into materials. In period 3, all the returns are recycled into materials. 
The analytical results are derived. 
Findings – The result of the analyses suggest that (a) among the variables that affect 
the (re-)manufacturing decision, the purchase price for returned batteries plays a critical 
role. In particular, the price of low-quality returns has more influence than the price of 
high quality returns. (b) Interestingly, the higher purchase price for re-usable returns 
does not necessarily lead to a higher return rate of reusable returns. (c) The manufac-
turer’s profit is normally higher than the remanufacturer’s. This suggests the need to 
design incentives to promote the remanufacturing sector. (d) Although it is appreciated 
that maximising the utilisation of batteries over the life-cycle would benefit the envi-
ronment, the economic benefit needs further investigation. 
Originality/value – Although the CLSC has been widely studied, studies on the EV 
battery CLSC are scarce. The EV battery CLSC is particularly challenging in terms of 
the reusability of returns because used EV batteries cannot be reused for the original 
purpose, which complicates CLSC operations. This paper explores the interrelationship 
between manufacturer and remanufacturer, explaining the reasons why recycling is still 
underdeveloped, and suggests the possibility of enhancing remanufacturing profitabil-
ity. 
Key words – Closed-loop supply chain, Electric vehicle battery, Recycle, Reuse, Pur-
chasing price, Profit 
Paper type – Research paper 
 
1. Introduction 
With the aim of achieving sustainable development, electric vehicles (EVs) are 
considered one of the future directions for the automotive industry. One of the earliest 
studies regarding EV’s history, progress and advantages can be found in Turner and 
Heusinger (1984). In the 21st century, the EV industry is developing and the uptake of 
EVs is increasing rapidly. According to the International Energy Agengy (2016), from 
2005 to 2010 the number of EV sales, including pure battery EVs and plug-in hybrid 
EVs (PHEVs), increased from 1670 to 12,480 worldwide. Since then, the number of 
new-energy vehicles has been increased even more sharply. By 2015, the stock of EVs 
was 1,256,900, which is almost 752 times higher than 10 years ago. 
One of the most important components of an EV is the battery. The high uptake of 
EVs leads to a high demand for EV batteries. The battery’s operating life affects the 
EV’s mileage directly. For example, Tesla model S P90D’s battery duration is 430km 
with an embedded 95kWh battery (Tesla, 2016). The working mileage of an EV battery 
may affect the desirability to customers of buying an EV. Unlike gasoline vehicles, EVs 
cannot use their batteries until they reach the end of their life-cycle. Instead, the 
batteries have to be removed when their capacity fall to around 70–80% due to 
performance and safety concerns (McIntire-Strasburg, 2015). In early 2010, the US 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory undertook a project on EV battery reuse 
(Neubauer and Pesaran, 2010). The report shows that a recycled battery can be reused 
in the following ways: (a) grid-based stationary, for example energy time shifting, 
renewables capacity firming; (b) off-grid stationary, for example backup power and 
remote installations; and (c) mobile, for example commercial idle management or 
public transportation. Those applications for EV second use could significantly increase 
the total lifetime value of money, and thus reduce the cost to the electric automotive 
user.  
Most of the research studying the reuse of EV batteries has focused on the technical 
aspects (e.g. Lih et al., 2012; Neubauer and Pesaran, 2011; Patten et al., 2011; Yu et al., 
2013). How reuse of EV batteries affects the operational performance and profit of the 
closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) remains untouched. From an operations management 
point of view, research lags behind the industry. In response to automotive batteries 
being banned from landfill or incineration, EV battery collection and recycling 
networks have been built. Nevertheless, most of the returned batteries are recycled into 
materials rather than being reused. To deal with this issue, some industrial initiatives 
exist, for instance in North America, Tesla, working with Kinsbursky Brothers, recycled 
about 60% of its battery packs; in Europe, Tesla started working with Umicore on 
recycling (Kelty, 2011); and Nissan and Volkswagen require their EV customers to 
return used batteries to licensed points or local authority battery collection schemes 
(Nissan, 2015; Volkswagen, 2016). Now more and more EV manufacturers are involved 
in reusing EV batteries. For example, BMW and Nissan are expected to reuse returned 
batteries as home energy storage (Ayre, 2016; Dalton, 2016). Chevrolet has set up an 
energy storage station by using used EV batteries at the General Motors facility in 
Michigan (Voelcker, 2016). 
Inspired by these applications, we built a three-period model to describe the EV 
CLSC process. There are two participants in the model: the manufacturer, who produces 
new EV batteries (over the three periods); and the remanufacturer, who collects used 
batteries and sorts them into reusable and recyclable based on the quality of the returns 
in period 2. The reused batteries will be recycled in period 3. In period 1, batteries are 
only made from raw materials. There are no returned or recycled batteries in this period. 
In period 2, returned batteries are sorted into low quality and high quality. The high-
quality returns are further sorted into reusable and recyclable. The recyclable returns 
will be recycled into materials. In period 3, those reused batteries reach the end of their 
life and will be collected and recycled into materials. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews some relevant 
literature and clarifies our contribution to the literature. Section 3 describes the model 
and derives the optimal quantity, the optimal purchase price and the maximised profit 
for manufacturer and remanufacturer, respectively. Section 4 conducts a numerical 
study. Finally, Section 5 concludes our findings and discusses the limitations as well as 
future research. 
 
2. Closely related literature 
The model developed in this paper is related to EV battery reuse and recycling in a 
multi-period CLSC. In this section, the relevant literature on battery reuse and multi-
period SC is reviewed. The purpose is to justify the differences between our model and 
existing models, and hence our contribution to the literature.  
Most research discusses how EV batteries can be reused from a technical point of 
view. There are very few studies focusing on economic benefits. Patten et al. (2011) 
discuss how EV batteries can be used in a wind storage system to improve utilisation 
and make more efficient use of EV batteries prior to recycling. Assuncao et al. (2016) 
built a model of how repurposed EV batteries can be used to support solar energy. The 
model is analysed from both technical and economic aspects. In their model, they allow 
users to generate energy and inject it into the grid for economic benefits. As shown in 
that paper, the used batteries could be reused for more than 10 years and will bring a 
good payback to customers. Ahmadi et al. (2014) and Aziz et al. (2015) studied the 
performance of reused EV batteries in rebalancing the electricity grid. They state that 
if repurposed batteries are used to store off-peak electricity to serve peak demand, 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions will be reduced by around 56%. However, some people 
have different views. Although used EV batteries could be a potential enhancement of 
cost-effective energy storage, Neubauer and Pesaran (2011) argue that even though the 
second use of the batteries is not expected to significantly affect PHEV/EV price, long-
term battery degradation and second-use applications need to be investigated in more 
detail. 
The CLSC is a well-studied yet challenging area in particular when it becomes a 
multi-period model. There are several papers that study a two-period model (Atasu et 
al., 2008; Ferguson and Toktay, 2006; Mitra and Webster, 2008; Webster and Mitra, 
2007; Majumder and Groenevelt, 2001), most of which focus on the relationship and 
decision making between manufacturer and remanufacturer. For instance, Majumder 
and Groenevelt (2001) study a two-period competition model between an original 
equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a local remanufacturer by fixing the total cost for 
dealing with the returned items. The model developed by Mitra and Webster (2008) 
analyses the regulation of remanufacturing activities. Moreover, from the multi-period 
aspect, Ferrer and Swaminathan (2010) analyse the (re)manufacturer monopoly 
environment from a two-period to a multi-period planning horizon, and develop a 
strategy for optimising price for the firm in the model. 
The literature review suggests that the existing multi-period CLSC models do not 
reflect the practices of used EV battery reuse and recycling and the characteristics of 
such CLSC; that is, unlike normal goods, EV batteries cannot be reused for their 
original purpose, which complicates normal CLSC operations. Therefore, the 
contribution of this study is to fill the CLSC research gap in EV battery recycling and 
reuse. This paper explores the interrelationship between EV battery manufacturer and 
remanufacturer, explains the reasons why recycling is still underdeveloped. 
Our study is closely related to two models. The first is a general two-period model 
designed by Bulmus et al. (2014), which involves an OEM and an independently oper-
ating remanufacturer (IO). In period 1, only the OEM is included, while in period 2 
both OEM and IO are included in competition. The authors analyse the manufactur-
ing/remanufacturing optimal quantity and profit under Nash equilibrium conditions. 
Relationships between these and several different parameters – that is, market size, 
(re)manufacturing cost in each period, return rate and so on – are discussed in their 
model. In this paper, we expand the model from a two-period to a three-period model, 
where returned batteries are reused before being recycled into materials in period three. 
This is moreover similar to Cai et al. (2014), whose model studies the optimal acquisi-
tion and production policy in a hybrid manufacturing and remanufacturing system in-
cluding high-quality core remanufacturer and low-quality core remanufacturer. In our 
model, we further classify the returned batteries into high quality, low quality and re-
usable returns. 
 
3. Model description and formulation 
We consider a three-period model to describe an EV battery manufacturing/ remanu-
facturing system as shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: A three-period model in a manufacturing/remanufacturing system 
 
 In period 1, all EV batteries are made from raw materials. The battery manufactur-
ing quantity is based on the EV demand. 
 In period 2, the batteries are made from raw materials and recycled materials from 
returned batteries, both high and low quality. A proportion, θ , of used EV batteries is 
returned. According to Erp-batteries (2012) and Gaines and Singh (1995), recycled bat-
teries have different conditions so their values are different. We classify returns into 
two levels: α  refers to the proportion of high-quality returns and (1 α− ) to low-qual-
ity returns. Then, high-quality returns will be sorted further. β  refers to the proportion 
that is recycled into materials, and (1 )β− the proportion that is reused in other places 
for a certain period. This means that these reused batteries will not be recycled in period 
2. Furthermore, because there will be a loss in the process, we set lλ  and hλ  as the 
remanufacturing rates for low- and high- quality returns, respectively. We assume that 
the remanufacturing cost for low-quality returns is higher than that for high-quality re-
turns, that is, 2 2h lc c< . 
 In period 3, the reused batteries reach the end of their life and they will be recycled 
as well. Hence, in this period batteries are made from raw materials and recycled ma-
terials from high- and low- quality returns as well as reused batteries. The recycling rate 
for reused batteries is uλ . 
All the notations used are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Notations 
General parameters 
; 1, 2,3EViM i =  Potential EV market size in 
period i  
 
A  Coefficient between 
battery material quan-
tity and EV quantity: 
, ( 0)i EViq Aq A= >  
mδ  Coefficient between EV 
sale price and material 
price:
, (0 1)i m EVi mp pδ δ= < <  
; 1, 2,3EVik i =  For simplification, we 
define  
/ ( )EVi m EVik AMδ=  
θ  Battery return yield α  Proportion of high 
quality returns among 
total returns 
1 β−  Reusable rate among high 
quality returns 
naturec  Cost of purchasing raw 
materials 
nc  Manufacturing cost of new 
battery 
hc  Remanufacturing cost 
of high-quality returns 
lc  Remanufacturing cost of 
low-quality returns 
uc  Remanufacturing cost 
of reused battery 
hλ  High-quality returns’ recy-
cling rate into materials 
( 0 1hλ< < ) 
lλ  Low-quality returns 
recycling rate 
( 0 1lλ< < ) 
uλ  Reused EV battery recy-
cling rate ( 0 1uλ< < ) 
; 1, 2,3EVip i =  EV price in period i  
; 1, 2,3EViq i =  Quantity of EV demand in 
period i  
  
Decision variables 
; 1, 2,3ip i =  Battery selling price in pe-
riod i  
; 1, 2,3iq i =  Total amount of bat-
tery needed in period 
i   
; 1, 2,3inq i =  Amount of battery made 
from raw material in pe-
riod i  
; 2,3ilq i =  Quantity of recycled 
materials from low 
quality returns in pe-
riod i  
; 2,3ihq i =  Quantity of recycled mate-
rials from high quality re-
turns in period i  
; 2,3ils i =  Price of purchasing 
low-quality returns in 
period i  
; 2,3ihs i =  Price of purchasing high-
quality returns in period i  
3us  Price of purchasing re-
used batteries in period 
3 
3uq  Quantity of batteries re-
manufactured from reused 
batteries in period 3 
; 1, 2,3in iΠ =  Profit for new battery 
manufacturing in pe-
riod i  
; 2,3il iΠ =  Profit for low-quality re-
turns remanufacturing in 
period i  
; 2,3ih iΠ =  Profit for high quality 
returns remanufactur-
ing in period i  
3uΠ  Profit for re-used battery 
remanufacturing in period 
3 
  
For simplification, we assume that each of the initial parameters is the same over 
the three periods. 
 
3.1 Nash equilibrium in period 1 
This study discusses EV battery, and its manufacturing quantity is based on EV market. 
Assume EV market size is 1EVM , its sale price is 1EVp . Customer’s willingness to pay 
for the EV is v . We assume that 1EVp  and v  have a uniform distribution between 0 
and 1, i.e., [0,1]v∈  and 1 [0,1]EVp ∈ . By adopting the same utility-based approach as 
Ferguson and Toktay (2006), Bulmus et al. (2014) and Debo et al. (2005) , customer 
utility of buying EVs is 1EVU v p= − . The quantity of EVs sold in this period becomes 
 1 1 1(1 )EV EV EVq M p= −   (1) 
Assume that the demand for battery material is 1 1, ( 0)EVq Aq A= >  and the price 
of an EV battery for each EV is 1 1, (0 1)m EV mp pδ δ= < < , where A  and mδ  are co-
efficients. As in period 1, all EV batteries are made from raw materials, that is 1 1nq q= . 
Hence, through substituting 1q  and 1p  into (1), we have 
 1 1 1(1 / )n EV mq AM p δ= −   (2) 
Let 1 1/ ( )m EVk AMδ=  and, through formula transformation, the battery price in pe-
riod 1 is 
 1 1 1m np k qδ= −   (3) 
Battery manufacturer’s profit is the sale price minus both the raw materials pur-
chasing cost and the manufacturing cost, then multiplied by the quantity of batteries 
sold. Through substituting (3), the profit can be expressed as: 
 ( )1 1 1 1 1 1( )n n nature n m n n nature np c c q k q c c qδΠ = − − = − − −   (4) 
To make the study non-trivial and allow profitable manufacturing, we let 
10 ( ) 1n naturec c p< + < <  to ensure the profit for the battery manufacturer is positive;that 
is 1 0nΠ > . 
As 
2
1
12
1
2 0n
n
k
q
∂ Π
= − <
∂
, 1nΠ  is a convex function. Therefore, the maximised profit 
that the battery manufacturer will achieve at 1
1
0n
nq
∂Π
=
∂
 . So, the optimal quantity for 
manufacturer *1nq  in period 1 is: 
 *1
12
m n nature
n
c cq
k
δ − −
=   (5) 
We have *1 0nq >  as 0 ( )n nature mc c δ< + < . From Equation (5), we can conclude 
that the optimal quantity for the new battery manufacturer has negative relationship 
with nc  and naturec . This also means that, with the increase in the raw materials price 
and the manufacturing cost, the optimal quantity for manufacturing a new EV battery 
is decreasing. Meanwhile, as can be seen in Equation (3), the lower the manufacturing 
quantity, the higher the sale price 1p , reflecting the theory of market leverage. 
 
3.2 Nash equilibrium in period 2 
Similar to period 1, the demand for EVs depends on market size and EV price in period 
2: 
 2 2 2(1 )EV EV EVq M p= −   (6) 
With 2 2EVq Aq=  and 2 2m EVp pδ= , the quantity of EV batteries required in this pe-
riod is: 
 2 2 2(1 / )EV mq AM p δ= −   (7) 
And letting ( )2 2/m EVk AMδ= , we can derive the EV battery price function by the 
inverse of (7): 
 2 2 2mp k qδ= −   (8) 
In this period, θ  of batteries will be returned. These returned batteries will be sorted 
into three classes: reusable, high-quality and low-quality. As shown in Figure 1, reusa-
ble returns will be reused in other places, for instance, for energy storage. Only high-
quality and low-quality returns will be recycled into materials. Therefore, in period 2, 
the materials needed for producing batteries come from three parts: raw material, ma-
terial recycled from high-quality returns and material recycled from low-quality returns. 
The demand for raw materials is the total demand for materials minus the quantity of 
recycled materials: 
 2 2 2 2n l hq q q q= − −    (9) 
We can derive the inverse of demand function (9) by substituting (8) as follows: 
 2 2 2 2 2( )m n l hp k q q qδ= − + +   (10) 
The total return at period 2 is the return rate θ  multiplied by the quantity of existing 
battery material in the previous period, 1EVA qθ .  
    Applying the utility-based concepts as described in period 1, assuming that the 
purchasing price for returns, both high quality and low quality, obeys a uniform distri-
bution [0,1], we derive the return quantity for high and low quality in Equation (11): 
 2 1 2
2 1 2
(1 )
(1 )(1 )
h EV h
l EV l
q A q s
q A q s
θ αβ
θ α
= −
 = − −
  (11) 
Because of different values for different qualities, we have 2 2h ls s> .  
The quantity of materials made from different classes of return is the return quantity 
multiplied by the returned batteries salvageable rate, hλ  and lλ . The profit for manu-
facturer and remanufacturer is defined as battery sales revenue minus recycling cost 
and returned battery purchase price. Hence, by substituting (10), profit functions for 
manufacturer and remanufacturer (e.g. both low-quality and high-quality) are: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
( )n n nature n m n l h n nature n
l l l l l l m n l h l l l
h h h h h h m n l h h h h
p c c q k q q q c c q
p c s q k q k q k q c s q
p c s q k q k q k q c s q
δ
λ λ δ
λ λ δ
Π = − − = − + + − −
Π = − − = − − − − −
Π = − − = − − − − −
  (12) 
We also assume 2 n naturep c c> +  , 2 2l l lp c sλ > +  and 2 2h h hp c sλ > +  to ensure a 
positive profit. In addition, due to the higher loss in the recycling process for low-qual-
ity returns, we have l hλ λ< . 
Through the second-order condition, we find that 2nΠ , 2lΠ and 2hΠ  are all convex 
functions: 
 
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 22 2 2
2 2 2
02 2 0; 02;n l hl h
n l h
k k k
q q q
λ λ
∂ Π ∂ Π ∂ Π
= − = − < = −
∂ ∂
< <
∂
  (13) 
So, they all have the maximum profit which can be achieved by using the first-
order condition, that is, 2 2 2
2 2 2
0n l h
n l hq q q
∂Π ∂Π ∂Π
= = =
∂ ∂ ∂
: 
 ( )
( )
* * *
2 2 2 2 2 2
* * *
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
* * *
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 0
2 0
2 0
m n l h n nature
l m n l h l l
h m n l h h h
k q k q k q c c
k q k q k q c s
k q k q k q c s
δ
λ δ
λ δ
 − − − − − = − − − − − =

− − − − − =
  (14) 
Proof of the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium can be found in Appendix A. 
Combining Equation (11) and (14), the optimal values are shown as: 
 
( )( )
2 1
21
21 22
23*
2
22 24 22 2 23 1
3 3
2
4 3
3 4 2
h h l
l l
EV l h
EV
l
c
c
k q
J
J J
J
s
J J qJ
c
kJ
α β β β λ λ
λ
αβλ
  + + + −
 − +    + −  
+ −
=   (15) 
 
( )( )
( ) 2
21
21 22
23*
2
22 24 22 23
1
2 1
1 3
2
(1 )(1 ) 3 4
3 4 2
h h l
h h
l h EV
V
h
E
J
J J
c
c
c J
s
J J J
k q
k qJ
α λ λ
λ
α αβ λ
 − − 
 − +    + + − + +  
+ −
=   (16) 
Where ( )21 n nature mc cJ δ+ +=  , 222 1EVJ Ak qθ=  , ( )23 1 h lAJ α αβθλ λ= −  ,
( )24 h l lJ αβλ λ αλ= + − . 
 ( )22
2
* *
2* 3 3
4
h l l h h l l h ml h n nature
h l
n
s c c c cs
q
k
λ λ λ λ λ λ δ
λ λ
+ + + + −
=
−
  (17) 
 ( )22
2
* *
2* 3 3
4
h l l h h l l h ml h n nat
l
ure
h l
c cs s c c
k
q
λ λ λ λ λ λ δ
λ λ
− + + − + +
=
+
  (18) 
 ( )22
2
* *
2* 3 3
4
h l h l ll h
h
h l h m n nature
h l
c c c c
k
s s
q
λ λ λ λ λ λ δ
λ λ
− + − + +
=
+
  (19) 
From Equations (15) and (16), we can see that the decision on optimal purchasing 
prices mainly depends on remanufacturing cost, but also is influenced by other factors 
such as EV market size, return yield and salvageable rate. 
In Equations (17)-(19), only *2hs  and 
*
2ls  are the decision variables; the rest are 
input constants. Therefore, we focus on how these two decision variables affect *q . 
Observing the above equations, knowing that h lλ λ> , it suggests that the decision on 
the optimal purchasing price for low-quality returns is more influenced by *2ls  than 
*
2hs . But this fact is less prominent in deciding the optimal 
*
2hq . In general, Equations 
(17)-(19) suggest the following: 
• The higher the purchase price of returns, the less motivation for remanufactur-
ing because of reduced profit. Hence, using raw materials becomes a favourable 
choice, as shown in Equation (17). 
• The lower the purchase price of low-quality returns, *2ls , the higher the reman-
ufacturing of low-quality returns, *2lq , as shown in Equation (18), which leads 
to the following point. 
• The need for remanufacturing of high-quality returns is reducing, because the 
total * * *2 2 2l h nq q q+ +  is meant to cover the total demand for battery. Hence, the 
higher *2lq , the lower 
*
2nq  and 
*
2hq . 
We then use * *2 2l hq q+  to present the total optimal remanufacturing amount, and 
* * *
2 2 2l h nq q q+ +  to mean the total optimal amount of manufacturing and remanufacturing. 
The purpose is to understand the influence of the purchase price on the (re-)manufac-
turing operations as a whole. From Equation (17)-(19), we have 
 ( )
* *
2 2* *
2 2
22
h l l h h l l h m n nature
h
l
l h
l
h c c c c
k
s s
q q
λ λ λ λ λ λ δ
λ λ
− − − − + + +
+ =   (20) 
 ( )
* *
2 2* * * *
2 2 2 2
2
3
4
h l l h h l l h m n natureh
l
l
h
l
h n
c cs s
q q q
c c
k
q
λ λ λ λ λ λ δ
λ λ
− − − − −
+ =
+
+
−
=   (21) 
Observing Equations (20) and (21), we find that both *2hs  and 
*
2ls  have a nega-
tive relationship between both * *2 2l hq q+  and 
* * *
2 2 2l h nq q q+ + . 
• Equation (20) suggests that the higher the return purchase price, the lower 
the remanufacturing quantity. 
• Nevertheless, the total amount of manufacturing and remanufacturing in 
period 2 is decided by other factors other than purchase price alone. In this 
case, the cost of producing new batteries and the purchase price of raw ma-
terials play important roles, as shown in Equation (21). 
In summary, if we use + /−  to represent a positive/negative correlation relationship, 
the relationship between quantity and the returned battery purchase prices is shown in 
Table 2 below: 
Table 2: Relationship between optimal quantities and purchase price in period 2 
        Input variable 
Decision variable 
*
2hs  
*
2ls  
*
2lq  +  −  
*
2hq  −  +  
*
2nq  +  +  
* *
2 2l hq q+  −  −  
* * *
2 2 2l h nq q q+ +  −  −  
 
3.3 Nash equilibrium in period 3 
Similarly, the EV quantity desired in period 3 is 
 3 3 3(1 )EV EV EVq M p= −   (22) 
With 3 3EVq Aq=  and 3 3m EVp pδ= , the demand for EV batteries in this period is: 
 3 3 3(1 / )EV mq AM p δ= −   (23) 
And letting ( )3 3/m EVk AMδ= , we can achieve the price function deriving from Equa-
tion (23): 
 3 3 3mp k qδ= −   (24) 
In this period, the battery material consists of raw materials, high and low quality 
returns and end-of-life reused battery returns. The quantity of demand for new batteries 
equals the total market demand minus all EV batteries made from returns: 
 3 3 3 3 3n l h uq q q q q= − − −   (25) 
And the price: 
 3 3 3 3 3 3( )m n l h up k q q q qδ= − + + +   (26) 
The return quantity in period 3 is new batteries manufactured in period 2 multiplied by 
the return rate which is 2EVA qθ . In this period, all returns in all three classes will be 
recycled with the quantities: 
 
3 2 3
3 2 3
3 2 3
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
(1 )(1 )
l EV l
h EV h
u EV u
q A q s
q A q s
q A q s
θ α
θ αβ
θ α β
= − − = −
= − −
  (27) 
The profits for manufacturer and remanufacturer (e.g. low-quality, high-quality and 
reused batteries) are: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
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(28) 
The profits above are all convex because of: 
 
2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 32 2 2 2
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 (29) 
Using first-order condition to acquire the optimal profit for each agent: 
 
3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3
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3 3 3 3 3 3
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  (30) 
Proof of the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium can be found in Appendix B. 
Combining Equations (27) and (30): 
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 (33) 
Where ( )31 n nature mc cJ δ+ += , 332 2EVJ Ak qθ= , ( )33 h u uJ β λ λ λ= − + , 
( ) ( )34 1 1 h l uAJ α α β βθλ λ λ− −= , ( )( )335 l lJJ λ α λ+ −= , 
( ) ( )( )36 4 1 4 1h l h l l uJ α βλ λ β αβλ λ αλ λ− + − + −= , ( )37 1J α= − , ( )38 1J β= − , 
( )( )39 383 4h l ucJ Jβλ λ α β+= + − , 
( )( )( )310 314 1 4 4h h l l hc cJ Jαβ αβ λ α λ αβλ+ + += − − , 
( ) ( )( )311 37 1 38 381 2l n nature l l u m l uc c c cJ J J J Jαβ λ α λ λ δ λ α− + + + − + + −= , 
( )( ) ( )( )312 37 37 14 1 4l h h h lJ J J Jc cαβ λ λ λ− + + −= , ( )313 37 38 3 1h l uJ cJ Jλ λ β− −= , 
( )( )( )314 37 31 37 311 2 2l l h hJ J J J Jc cλ α β λ− − + + + −= , 
( )( )315 37 373 4 1 4h u l l uJ c JcJβλ λ α αβ λ− + − −= , 
( )( )316 37 314 3u l h hJ J Jcλ λ β λ= + + − . 
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In Equations (31)-(33), the decision on optimizing return purchase prices (e.g. low-
quality, high-quality and reused batteries) is rather complicated. It is influenced by 
various factors, but certainly remanufacturing costs play a crucial role. 
Equations (34)-(37) appear to have the same pattern. In general, the higher the purchase 
price for that class, the lower the remanufacturing quantity for that specific class. This 
makes perfect sense. Because remanufacturer’s decision on the production quantity 
must be based on the maximizing profit. With relatively fixed remanufacturing cost, the 
higher purchasing price, the less profit.  
In more detail, from Equations (34)-(37), with a focus on how *3hs ,
*
3ls ,
*
3us  influ-
ence the decision variables, we assume that h u lλ λ λ> > ; 4 u h u h h l u lλ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ> > > ;
4 h l u h u lλ λ λ λ λ λ> > ; 4 u l u h h lλ λ λ λ λ λ> > . This suggests: 
 *3ls  has more influence than *3hs  and *3us  on *3nq , and it also has more impact 
on *3lq .  
 *3hs has more influence on *3hq  and *3us  has more influence on *3uq ; 
With the addition of Equations (34)-(37), we have the following: 
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 (39) 
Equation (38) presents the total optimal remanufacturing amount, and Equation (39) 
the total optimal amount of manufacturing and remanufacturing in period 3. Comparing 
with period 2, there is one more decision variable which is *us . The result suggests the 
following: 
 The higher return purchasing price ( *3ls  , *3hs  , *3us  ), the lower remanufacturing 
quantity, as shown in (38); 
 Because of u h h l u lλ λ λ λ λ λ> >  , 
*
3ls  plays more important roles in both total 
optimal amount of remanufacturing and total optimal amount of manufacturing 
and remanufacturing, compared with *3hs  and 
*
3us  . Moreover, 
*
3hs  impacts 
less on those two optimal amounts while the impact of *3us  is between them.  
To summarise, the relationship between quantity and returned battery purchase 
price in period 3 is shown Table 3: 
Table 3: Relationship between optimal quantities and purchase price in period 3 
        Input variable 
Decision variable 
*
3hs  
*
3ls  
*
3us  
*
3lq  +  −  +  
*
3hq  −  +  +  
*
3uq  +  +  −  
*
3nq  +  +  +  
* * *
3 3 3l h uq q q+ +  −  −  −  
* * * *
3 3 3 3l h u nq q q q+ + +  −  −  −  
 
4. Numerical study 
4.1 Numerical example 
In this section, we come up with a numerical example to demonstrate the model.  
According to International Energy Agency (2017), EV market size is predicted to 
18,000,000 in 2020, i.e. 18 000 000EVM = ， ， . And EV battery price accounts for around 
30% of electric car price i.e. 0.3mδ = . 
According to Lambert (2017) and Mark (2014), taking Tesla Model as example, the 
nature resources for each battery on EV costs £8200 with manufacturing cost £3500. 
According to Binks (2016) and Will Date (2015), it averagely costs £860 to process a 
used battery. We assume the low-quality used battery recycling processing cost is 
£950, high-quality is £850 and reusable battery is £800. To normalize the cost into the 
same scale, without losing generality, we set 0.1naturec = as benchmarking, other costs 
other costs against the benchmark 0.1*950 / 8200 0.012lc = = ,
0.1*850 / 8200 0.011hc = = , 0.1*800 / 8200 0.01uc = = ,
0.1*3550 / 8200 0.043nc = = . 
The parameters are shown in Table 4 below: 
Table 4: Numerical example parameters 
18 000 000EVM = ， ，  4A =  0.3mδ =  0.8θ =  0.6α =  
0.7β =  0.5lλ =  0.8hλ =  0.65uλ =  0.1naturec =  
0.043nc =  0.012lc =  0.011hc =  0.01uc =   
 
In Period 1, applying Equations (1)-(5), the optimal quantity for battery raw ma-
terials (which is also the optimal total quantity) is * * 71 1 1.8 10nq q= = × . The optimal sale 
price is *1 0.221p = . The optimal profit that the battery manufacturer will achieve is 
* 6
1 1.49 10nΠ = × .  
In period 2, we substitute * 61 4.72 10EVq = ×  as the initial parameter by applying 
Equation (1). Through applying Equation (15)-(19), the optimal values are shown be-
low: 
Table 5: Optimal values in period 2 
*
2 0.076ls =  
*
2 0.13hs =  
* 6
2 5.58 10lq = ×  
* 6
2 5.51 10hq = ×  
* 7
2 1.33 10nq = ×  
Total quantity of battery material * 72 2.22 10q = ×
 
Optimal sale price for EV battery *2 16236p =
 
Profit for low-quality EV battery remanufacturer *2 64926lΠ =
 
Profit for high-quality EV battery remanufacturer *2 101560hΠ =
 
Profit for new EV battery manufacturer *2 740030nΠ =
 
In period 3, through Equation (6), we substitute * 62 6.11 10EVq = ×  as the initial EV 
quantity in this period. The optimal values are derived by using Equations (31)-(37), as 
in Table 6: 
Table 6: Optimal values in period 3 
*
3 0.065ls =  
*
3 0.113hs =  
*
3 0.102us =   
* 6
3 7.31 10lq = ×  
* 6
3 7.28 10hq = ×  
* 6
3 4.72 10uq = ×  
* 7
3 1.00 10nq = ×  
Entire quantity for the battery material * 73 2.93 10q = ×
 
Optimal sale price for EV battery *3 14596p =
 
Profit for low quality EV battery remanufacturer *3 87427lΠ =
 
Profit for high quality EV battery remanufacturer *3 138820hΠ =
 
Profit for re-used EV battery remanufacturer *3 20443uΠ =
 
Profit for new EV battery manufacturer *
3 351840nΠ =
 
 
4.2 Analysis 
In this section, we study the relationship between the parameters (i.e. θ ,α , β , lλ , hλ ,
uλ ) and (re)manufacturer’s profit in each period. The first column in Figures 2-7 shows 
profit in period 2; the second column shows profit in period 3; and the third column 
compares the total profit in periods 2 and 3. 
In order to better study the parameters’ features, we keep the market size among three 
periods fixed. The initial input variables are given in Table 7: 
Table 7: Value of parameters 
18 000 000EVM = ， ，  4A =  0.3mδ =  0.8θ =  0.6α =  
0.7β =  0.5lλ =  0.8hλ =  0.65uλ =  0.1naturec =  
0.043nc =  0.012lc =  0.011hc =  0.01uc =   
 
1) Analysis of return rate and sorting proportion (θ ,α , β ) 
We set [0.1 0.9]θ ∈  while fixing other parameters as shown in Table 7. 
 
Figure 2:  θ  vs Profit in Period 2 and Period 3 
With the return rate θ  increasing, the profit for the manufacturer is decreasing 
while the profit for the remanufacturer is increasing. The profit for manufacturer is al-
ways greater than that for the remanufacturer. It can be found that the profit on high 
quality returns is greater than that for low-quality returns. The profit achieved from 
reused battery recycling is the lowest. Furthermore, through comparing the varying 
trend of profits between periods 2 and 3 in Figure 2, for θ , the profits for manufacturer, 
low quality return remanufacturer, high quality return remanufacturer are more sensi-
tive in period 3. Furthermore, the higher θ , the less total profit in period 2 and 3. But 
the total profit for period 3 is increasing when 0.8θ > . 
Now we discuss the high-quality return rate α . The results are shown in Figure 3. 
In general, with increasing α , (which also means a higher low-quality return rate), the 
profit for high quality remanufacturing increases, which is opposite trend to low quality 
remanufacturer. In period 3, both manufacturer and ‘reused’ remanufacturer’s profits 
are insensitive to α  although slight increase can be observed. However, low quality 
remanufacturer’s profit is getting less and less, with =0.9α , its profit ( *lΠ ) is even 
close to 0. On the contrary, the profit for high quality remanufacturer, *hΠ , is increasing. 
Because low quality remanufacturer cannot make profit if they don’t have returned bat-
teries when α  close to 1, while in this case, high quality remanufacturer will have 
more returns to make profit. Base on this, total profit is decreased when α  is low but 
it increases when α  is high. 
 
Figure 3: α  vs Profit in Period 2 and Period 3 
The reusable battery return rate, (1 )β− , has limited impact on low quality return’s 
remanufacturer ( *lΠ ). In period 3, the more the reusable battery, the higher the profit 
for manufacturer ( *nΠ ) and for the reusable battery remanufacturer (
*
uΠ ) as well, but 
less profit for high-quality returned battery remanufacturer ( *hΠ ). Furthermore, higher 
reusable battery return will lead to high total profit in period 2. But in period 3, with 
increasing of (1 )β− , the total profit in period 3 shows a tendency to decrease first and 
then increase afterwards. 
Figure 4: 1 β−  vs Profit in Period 2 and Period 3 
2) Analysis of remanufacturing rate ( lλ , hλ , uλ ) 
As can be seen in Figure 5, with the increasing of low quality returned battery remanu-
facturing rate lλ  , 
*
2hΠ   and 
*
3uΠ   is constant. Meanwhile, 
*
2nΠ  , 
*
2lΠ  , 
*
3nΠ   and 
*
3lΠ  are increasing slowly. The total profit in both period 2 and period 3 are keep in-
creasing. 
 
Figure 5:  lλ  vs Profit in Period 2 and Period 3 
Considering hλ , high quality returned battery remanufacturing rate, as shown in Fig-
ure 6, when it increases, profits are increasing except *2lΠ  (
*
2lΠ  keeps constant as 
there is no relationship between them). However, in period 3, all profits are decreased 
(but a tiny increase in low hλ ). This results from the increasing returned batteries’ 
purchase price. Combining these two, the total profit in period 2 is rising while the 
profit in period 3 is increasing first and keep dropping down when 0.4hλ > . 
 Figure 6: hλ  vs Profit in Period 2 and Period 3 
The reused battery remanufacturing rate uλ  only works in period 3. As we can find in 
Figure 7, with the condition of low uλ , profits for manufacturer and remanufacturer 
are even negative. Meanwhile, the higher the remanufacturing rate for reused batteries, 
the higher the profit to both manufacturer and remanufacturer. 
 
Figure 7: uλ  vs Profit in Period 3 
In summary, different parameters have different sensitivities and variation tenden-
cies for each (re)manufacturer’s profit in different periods. 
• The manufacturer normally gets more profit than the remanufacturer (ex-
cept the case about low high-quality return rate in period 3). 
• All parameters are more sensitive in period 3 than period 2. 
• With the increase of θ , the remanufacturer’s profit increases. 
• Increasing α  will result in more profit for the manufacturer, high-quality 
remanufacturer and re-usable remanufacturer, but less profit for the low-
quality returns remanufacturer. 
• Recycling rates ( lλ , hλ , uλ ) have less sensitivity than the sorting rate (θ ,α ,
(1 )β−  ). Except for hλ  in period 3, profits for each participant in this 
model show a small increase or remain the same. 
One of the most significant findings, from observing the above figures is that the total 
profit in period 3 is always smaller than that in period 2. The reason is that, because of 
the increase in returned batteries over these periods, the profit for the battery manufac-
turer (which occupies the majority of total profit) is decreasing and this has a direct 
impact on total profit. 
Therefore, to maintain the profit balance between manufacturer and remanufacturer, 
and to promote battery recycling, the government should pay close attention to policy 
and incentive mechanisms to enhance the total battery return rate (θ ) and the high-
quality return rate ( β ). Some technologies also need to be developed to improve recy-
cling efficiency, which will improve the total profit for the whole supply chain. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we develop a three-period EV battery recycling and reuse model. We de-
termine the unique Nash equilibrium among new EV battery manufacturer, low quality 
battery remanufacturer and high-quality battery remanufacturer as well as re-used bat-
tery remanufacturer. The purpose is to maximize individual’s profit through optimal 
purchase price and production quantity. 
We also analyze the influencing factors for the optimal (re)manufacturing quantity. 
The result of the analyses suggests that: (a) among the variables that have an impact on 
the (re-)manufacturing decision, the purchase price of returned batteries plays a critical 
role. Particularly, the price of low-quality returns has more influence than that of high-
quality returns. (b) Interestingly, a higher purchasing price for re-usable returns does 
not necessarily lead to higher return rate of reusable returns. (c) The manufacturer’s 
profit is always higher than remanufacturer’s. This suggests the need to design incen-
tives to promote the remanufacturing sector. (d) Although it is appreciated that max-
imising the utilisation of a battery over its life-cycle would benefit the environment, the 
economic benefit needs further investigation. 
Implication of the research results to practitioners have threefold: (1) Special at-
tention needs to be paid on low-quality returns as it has more significant impact on total 
profit; (2) Although high-quality return is encouraged, monetary incentive to obtain 
high-quality returns may not necessarily work; (3) To sustain recycling business, gov-
ernment support is vitally important to keep the business going. 
This paper develops the model based on the reality that most manufacturers and 
remanufacturers make decisions based on their own interests, the profit. There is a lack 
of coordination among the participants to achieve the maximized total profit for the EV 
battery CLSC. This leads to our suggestion for future research. In addition, our model 
suggests that reusing returned batteries does not bring economic benefits. How to real-
ize the benefits for the environment and the economy at same time needs further inves-
tigation. 
 
6. Reference 
Ahmadi, L., Yip, A., Fowler, M., Young, S.B. and Fraser, R.A. (2014), 
“Environmental feasibility of re-use of electric vehicle batteries”, Sustainable 
Energy Technologies and Assessments, Elsevier Ltd, Vol. 6, pp. 64–74. 
Assuncao, A., Moura, P.S. and de Almeida, A.T. (2016), “Technical and economic 
assessment of the secondary use of repurposed electric vehicle batteries in the 
residential sector to support solar energy”, Applied Energy, Vol. 181, pp. 120–
131. 
Atasu, A., Sarvary, M. and Van Wassenhove, L.N. (2008), “Remanufacturing as a 
Marketing Strategy”, Management Science, Vol. 54 No. 10, pp. 1731–1746. 
Ayre, J. (2016), “Nissan Reuses EV Batteries For Home Energy Storage — 
xStorage”, Cleantechnica, available at: 
https://cleantechnica.com/2016/05/15/nissan-recycles-ev-batteries-home-energy-
storage/ (accessed 30 December 2016). 
Aziz, M., Oda, T. and Kashiwagi, T. (2015), “Extended Utilization of Electric 
Vehicles and their Re-used Batteries to Support the Building Energy 
Management System”, Energy Procedia, Elsevier B.V., Vol. 75, pp. 1938–1943. 
Berg, S. (2009), “Recycling Used Lead Acid Batteries”, The Schumacher Institute for 
Technology and Development, Vol. 44 No. 871954. 
Binks, S. (2016), “Battery Recycling Process”, available at: 
https://www.removemycar.co.uk/battery-recycling.html (accessed 8 August 
2017). 
Bulmus, S.C., Zhu, S.X. and Teunter, R. (2014), “Competition for cores in 
remanufacturing”, European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier B.V., 
Vol. 233 No. 1, pp. 105–113. 
Cai, X., Lai, M., Li, X., Li, Y. and Wu, X. (2014), “Optimal acquisition and 
production policy in a hybrid manufacturing/ remanufacturing system with core 
acquisition at different quality levels”, European Journal of Operational 
Research, Elsevier B.V., Vol. 233 No. 2, pp. 374–382. 
Dalton, A. (2016), “BMW will repurpose i3 batteries for home energy storage”, 
Engadget, available at: https://www.engadget.com/2016/06/21/bmw-will-
repurpose-i3-batteries-for-home-energy-storage/ (accessed 30 December 2016). 
Debo, L.G., Toktay, L.B. and Van Wassenhove, L.N. (2005), “Market segmentation 
and product technology selection for remanufacturable products”, Management 
Science, INFORMS, Vol. 51 No. 8, pp. 1193–1205. 
Erp-batteries. (2012), “How are batteries recycled?” 
Ferguson, M. and Toktay, L.B. (2006), “The Effect of Competition on Recovery 
Strategies”, Production and Operations Management, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp. 351–
368. 
Ferrer, G. and Swaminathan, J.M. (2010), “Managing new and differentiated 
remanufactured products”, European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier 
B.V., Vol. 203 No. 2, pp. 370–379. 
Fred Lambert. (2017), “Tesla is now claiming 35% battery cost reduction at 
‘Gigafactory 1’ – hinting at breakthrough cost below $125/kWh | Electrek”, 
available at: https://electrek.co/2017/02/18/tesla-battery-cost-gigafactory-model-
3/ (accessed 8 August 2017). 
Gaines, L. and Singh, M. (1995), “Energy and Environmental Impacts of Electric 
Vehicle Battery Production and Recycling”, Argonne National Laboratory, 
available at: 
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/product.biblio.jsp?osti_id=201715%5Cnhttp://www.
osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/201715-9UFfKK/webviewable/. 
International Energy Agency. (2017), “Global EV Outlook 2017: Two million and 
counting”, IEA Publications, pp. 1–71. 
International Energy Agengy. (2016), “Global EV Outlook 2016 Beyond one million 
electric cars”. 
Kelty, K. (2011), “Tesla’s Closed Loop Battery Recycling Program”, Tesla, available 
at: https://www.tesla.com/blog/teslas-closed-loop-battery-recycling-program. 
Lih, W.-C., Yen, J.-H., Shieh, F.-H. and Liao, Y.-M. (2012), “Second use of retired 
lithium-ion battery packs from electric vehicles: technological challenges, cost 
analysis and optimal business model”, Computer, Consumer and Control (IS3C), 
2012 International Symposium on, IEEE, pp. 381–384. 
Majumder, P. and Groenevelt, H. (2001), “Competition in remanufacturing”, 
Production and Operations Management, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 125–141. 
Mark, M. (2014), “The backgground fot Tesla Model S Battery”, available at: 
https://xueqiu.com/8940100817/30082286 (accessed 8 August 2017). 
McIntire-Strasburg, J. (2015), “The Electric Vehicle Battery ‘Can And Should Be 
Recycled’”, Cleantechnica, available at: 
https://cleantechnica.com/2015/07/23/electric-vehicle-battery-can-recycled/. 
Mitra, S. and Webster, S. (2008), “Competition in remanufacturing and the effects of 
government subsidies”, International Journal of Production Economics, Vol. 
111 No. 2, pp. 287–298. 
Neubauer, J. and Pesaran, A. (2010), “PHEV/EV Li-Ion Battery Second-Use Project”, 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory, No. April. 
Neubauer, J. and Pesaran, A. (2011), “The ability of battery second use strategies to 
impact plug-in electric vehicle prices and serve utility energy storage 
applications”, Journal of Power Sources, Elsevier B.V., Vol. 196 No. 23, pp. 
10351–10358. 
Nissan. (2015), “Recycling Your Old Car Battery”, Nissan, available at: 
https://www.nissan.co.uk/recycle-your-old-car-battery.html. 
Patten, J., Christensen, N., Nola, G. and Srivastava, S. (2011), “Electric vehicle 
battery - Wind storage system”, 2011 IEEE Vehicle Power and Propulsion 
Conference, VPPC 2011, pp. 1–3. 
Tesla. (2016), “Model S”, available at: https://www.tesla.com/en_GB/models 
(accessed 30 December 2016). 
Turner, K. and Heusinger, K. Von. (1984), “Drive Electric”, Industrial Management 
& Data Systems, MCB UP Ltd, Vol. 84 No. 1/2, pp. 19–21. 
Voelcker, J. (2016), “Reusing electric-car batteries: great idea, lots of practical 
challenges”, Greencarreports, available at: 
http://www.greencarreports.com/news/1103363_reusing-electric-car-batteries-
great-idea-lots-of-practical-challenges (accessed 30 December 2016). 
Volkswagen. (2016), “Battery Recycling”, available at: 
http://www.volkswagen.co.uk/about-us/environment/battery-recycling. 
Webster, S. and Mitra, S. (2007), “Competitive strategy in remanufacturing and the 
impact of take-back laws”, Journal of Operations Management, Vol. 25 No. 6, 
pp. 1123–1140. 
Will Date. (2015), “Battery recycling costs expected to shoot up”, available at: 
http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/battery-collection-costs-expected-
to-shoot-up/ (accessed 8 August 2017). 
Yu, H.J., Zhang, T.Z., Yuan, J., Li, C.D. and Li, J.M. (2013), “Trial study on EV 
battery recycling standardization development”, Advanced Materials Research, 
Vol. 610, Trans Tech Publ, pp. 2170–2173. 
 
  
 
Appendix A 
 
Proof of exitance and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in period 2 
Combining equations (11) and (14), we have simultaneous equations 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
2
2
2
(1 ) (1 )
n l h n nature m
l n l l l h l l l m
h n h l h h h h h m
h EV h EV
l EV l EV
k q k q k q c c
k q k q k q s c
k q k q k q s c
q A q s A q
q A q s A q
δ
λ λ λ λδ
λ λ λ λ δ
θ αβ θ αβ
θ α θ α
− − − = + −
 − − − − = −− − − − = −
 + =
+ − = −
   (A1) 
The simultaneous equations above can be rewritten as 
AX B=                                 (A2) 
Where 
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
1
1
2 0 0
2 1 0
2 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 (1 ) 0
l l l
h h h
EV
EV
k k k
k k k
A k k k
A q
A q
λ λ λ
λ λ λ
θ αβ
θ α
− − − 
 − − − − 
 = − − − −
 
 
 − 
          (A3) 
 
[ ]2 2 2 2 2 'n l h l hX q q q s s=               (A4) 
 
1
1(1 )
n nature m
l l m
h h m
EV
EV
c c
c
B c
A q
A q
δ
λδ
λ δ
θ αβ
θ α
+ − 
 − 
 = −
 
 
 − 
                   (A5) 
Based on Linear algebra, it can be found that the rank for A and B has relationship 
( ) ( ) 5r A r B= =                           (A6) 
So, there is a solution and the only solution for simultaneous equations. Hence, period 
2 has an exitance and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. 
 
End. 
  
 
Appendix B 
Proof of exitance and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in period 3 
Combining equations (27) and (30), we have 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
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

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


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      (B1) 
The simultaneous equations above can be rewritten as 
AX B=                                 (B2) 
Where 
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
3 3 3 3
2
2
2
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= 02 0 1
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0 0 1 0 00
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[ ]3 3 3 3 3 3 3 'n l h u l h uX q q q q s s s=                 (B4) 
 
2
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2
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h h m
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Based on Linear algebra, it can be found that the rank for A and B has relationship 
( ) ( ) 7r A r B= =                          (B6) 
So, there is a solution and the only solution for simultaneous equations. Hence, period 
3 has an exitance and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. 
 
End. 
